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Abstract -  Recent  research  suggests  that,  due  to
misconfiguration,  DNS  reliability  and  performance  is  not
always as good as it should be. This paper therefore investigates
the  correct configuration of  DNS zones,  by checking if  main
configuration  requirements,  recommendations  and  best-
practices  rules  have been followed.  Our research shows  that
almost one out of four zones fail  to pass one or more of our
tests.  Our  study  reveals  an  interesting  correlation:  if  the
number of  name servers  for  a single  zone  exceeds  a  certain
number, reliability and performance usually decreases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The correct and error free operation of the Domain Name
System (DNS) is crucial for the reliability of most internet
applications,  like  e-mail,  web  browsing and  file  transfer.
Recent  research  [1]  indicates  that,  despite  DNS's  relative
robustness  against  physical  failures,  DNS  may  still  have
performance  and  reliability  problems,  because  of  human
configuration errors.
This  research  embraces  and  extends  the  research  of
Pappas et al., in an attempt to find more and different DNS
misconfigurations. In contrast with the checks performed by
Pappas et  al.,  our  checks will be performed on a random
selection  of  domain  names;  our  selection  process  does
therefore  not  use  criteria  like  visited  websites,  popular
websites, presence of a reverse DNS record or the possibility
to  transfer  zones.  To  ensure  that  our  findings  will  be
applicable  to  the  majority  of  DNS  zones  worldwide,  we
started from one of the best managed zones in the world:
the .NL zone ([1] Fig. 2a). Our checks are thus performed on
a random selection from the .NL Top Level Domain zone
file.
Our  checklist  is  based  on  the  technical  requirements
defined by the SIDN [5]  (regulatory body for  .NL zone),
research by Pappas et al., recommendations extracted from
RFCs  (Request  For  Comments,  a  set  of  technical  and
organizational  notes  concerning  the  internet)  as  well  as
personal experience. The implications of failing a test can
range from degraded performance, difficulties in moving a
domain  name,  to  being  unable  to  change  a  name  server
because SIDN will reject the associated zone since it does
not meet its requirements.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 starts
with  a  recapitulation  of  the  general  operation  of  DNS,
followed by an overview of our research method (Section 3).
Based  on above-mentioned  sources,  Section  4  proposes  a
number of checks. The results of these checks are discussed
in Section 5. Section 6 provides the conclusions.
II. GENERAL OPERATION OF DNS
An organizational  model  of  the  DNS system,  outlining
SIDN's  position  and  its  importance  for  .NL domains,  has
been  presented  in  [3].  Technically  speaking,  DNS  is
responsible  for  the  mapping between  host  names and  IP-
addresses, a process called resolving [9] [10]. A simplified
view of DNS, referring to Fig. 1, is that of a tree, containing
nodes called  zones (e.g.  utwente.nl)  and  leafs called  host
names (e.g. www.utwente.nl). Zones define in their Resource
Records (RRs), amongst others, the mapping between host
and IP addresses (A records),  mail  servers  (MX records),
addresses of other authoritative name servers for this zone
(NS  records),  as  well  as  administrative  data  (SOA,  TXT
records). Zones not only contain RRs for the current zone,
but possibly also for deeper zones and deeper host names. 
Systems can assume different roles (possibly multiple at
any time) in DNS (Fig. 1):
• Content  server:  a  name  server  providing  authoritative
answers  (e.g.  F:  ns1.utwente.nl).  Content  servers  can
either be masters (serving the zone from local data) or
slaves  (serving  the  zone  from data  provided  over  the
internet by a master server).
• Caching server:  a  name  server  resolving  a  host  name
recursively for a client (e.g. B: 192.168.1.1). Recursive
querying is performed by iteratively executing queries in
lieu of the client and passing back the final answer.
• Client: a system using a caching server to resolve a host
name (e.g. A: 192.168.1.203). 
A  typical  DNS  query  is  resolved  in  these  steps
(simplified, assuming no errors, again referring to Fig. 1):
1. A asks B to resolve www.utwente.nl using recursion.
2. After B checks its  cache,  B asks C for the address of
www.utwente.nl (no recursion).
3. C returns B the address of a server handling the .nl zone
(D).
4. B  asks  D  for  the  address  of  www.utwente.nl  (no
recursion).
5. D  returns  B  the  address  of  a  server  handling  the  .
utwente.nl zone (F).
6. B  asks  F  for  the  address  of  www.utwente.nl  (no
recursion).
7. F returns B the address of www.utwente.nl and the time
this information can be considered valid.
8. B returns A the requested information.
If  C  encounters  a  serious  error  querying one  server,  it
proceeds to the next server handling the zone, if available.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
At  the  time  of  this  study  (November  2004),  almost
1,300,000  domain  names  had  been  registered  in  the  .NL
zone. To create a representative test collection, we selected
10,000 names at random from this zone file. A sample of
10,000 names assures a 95% reliability [6], meaning that the
maximum deviation stays within 1%. Unfortunately, copies
of  the .NL zone file  can no longer  be  obtained from the
SIDN due to “security and privacy reasons”. For that reason
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we had to use an older copy, created at 27 February 2002; at
that time the rules to copy zone files were more relaxed.
From this  zone file,  containing 700,000  domain names,
domain names were selected in a random fashion, checked
whether  their  registration  was  current  (using  the  SIDN
“whois is” interface) until 10,000 names had been collected.
This occurred after 11,741 names had been checked. 
All 10,000 names, plus their name servers according to
the  .NL zone,  were  inserted into  a  database  as  seeds  to
retrieve. For each tuple of zone name and name server DNS
records were retrieved using an ANY query. If the results
contained additional name servers, these were inserted into
the database for retrieval too.
The  software  that  was written to  automate  this  process
uses DiG version 9.3.0 [7] to retrieve and parse responses
from name servers. If necessary, this software repeats each
query up to three times, using a maximum response time of
40  seconds  per  query.  If  responses  arrive  after  these  40
seconds,  but within 3*40=120 seconds (see section 7.2 of
[15]: Dead / Unreachable servers),  this is  logged for later
analysis.  Note  however  that  this  did  not  happen:  the
maximum response time for our queries was approximately
18 seconds. All these queries were performed in the evening
(CET) of November 5th 2004, using 20 parallel processes, in
about 4 hours.
IV. CHECKLIST
Requirements,  recommendations and best-practices rules
for configuring DNS zones have been defined by the SIDN
[4], literature [1] and a number of RFCs. Based on this, the
following checklist has been created:
• Does  the  name  server  respond  with  an  authoritative
answer to an ANY query for the domain? (Section 5.1)
No  authoritative  answer  to  a  query  is  a  serious  error
condition,  also  touching  end-users  in  almost  all
situations.
• How many name servers serve the zone? (Section 5.2)
Having too little or too many name servers can adversely
impact performance and reliability.
• Are the name servers in  the answer a superset of  the
entries  in  the  .NL  zone?  Can  any  elements  of  this
superset be registered in the .NL zone? (Section 5.3)
NS records  in deeper  zones  must match or  extend the
information in the .NL zone.
• Does the SOA record primary name server correspond
with one of the entries in the .NL zone? Do the values of
the  remainder  of  the  SOA  record  (serial  number,
refresh,  retry,  expiry,  minimum  TTL)  confirm  to
recommendations? (Section 5.4)
Correct values in the SOA record are crucial for reliable
and efficient zone replication and caching.
• How many MX servers are defined in a zone? (Section
5.5)
The number of MX servers influences the reliability and
performance of incoming mail for a domain.
• What  kind  of  name  server  software  serves  the  zone?
Does  the  name  server  also  act  as  a  caching  server?
(Section 5.6)
Availability and performance of the server also affect the
reliability and performance of DNS.
V. ANALYSIS
This section analyses the outcome of the checks that were
presented in the previous section.
A. Authoritative Response
Querying the .NL TLD (Top Level Domain) servers for
the 10,000 zones results in 22,311 zone-server tuples and an
equal number of DNS queries. The results of these queries
add an additional number of 917 zone-server mappings in
the database, totalling 23,228 queries distributed over 3,059
unique servers.  21,719  of these queries (93.50%) generate
an  authoritative  answer:  in  other  words  these  queries  are
answered correctly. 
Fig.  2  illustrates  the  distribution  of  different  error
conditions  (collectively called  “lame  delegations”)  among
the remaining 1,509 responses (6.50%). The observed errors
are: 
• The designated name server is not resolvable. This can
be caused by an error in an intermediary name server or a
cyclic zone dependency. Example: makelaarsoverzicht.nl
is  served  by  ns.aaaaa-hosting.nl,  however  ns.aaaaa-
hosting.nl  is  not  served  by  this  server,  so  glue  (A)
records  are  absent  in  the  .NL  zone.  The  servers
responsible  for  aaaaa-hosting.nl  return  NXDOMAIN,
non existent domain, for ns.aaaaa-hosting.nl so resolving
the name server and also the query fails. 
• The designated name server is not reachable; this error
occurs if no response is received from the server. Note
that besides hard- and software errors configuration can
also  be  the  cause  for  this  state.  For  example
ns.vuurwerk.nl  is  configured  to  disregard  queries  for
zones that it is not authoritative for.
• The name server returns an error condition. Out of the
Fig. 1. Path of a typical DNS query
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five  possible  errors  (FORMERR,  NOTIMP,  NXDOMAIN,
REFUSED,  SERVFAIL)  only  SERVFAIL (357)  and  REFUSED
(10) have been observed.  REFUSED means the server has
been specifically instructed to answer with an error to the
question  (possibly  based  on  IP  range),  SERVFAIL can
amongst others indicate missing zone data.
• The name server is not authoritative for the zone. This
occurs  when the server is  not  configured  as  a  content
DNS server for the current zone. Although such server
may respond  with valid  data  (acting  as  a  cache  DNS
server,  retrieving  the  information  from  another  name
server),  this  data  should  not  be  regarded  authoritative
(hence the missing of the aa bit) and should not be used
by clients or cache servers.
The deviation from specifications in all error conditions is
obvious:  a  content  DNS  server  should  respond  with  an
authoritative answer to a non- recursive query (for example
[5] item 5). 
The implications of these errors are:
• If, for a specific zone, none of the servers listed in the .
NL zone file responds without errors, that zone (and its
sub zones) is not resolvable at all. This happened to 398
of the 10,000 .NL zones.
• If, for a specific zone, one server responds with an error,
it  will  at  least  slow down  the  query  resolving  (more
details  in  the  next  paragraph)  but  depending  on  the
behaviour  of  the  resolver  might  also  result  in  not
resolving  at  all.  For  example,  we  detected
misconfiguration  of  the  renault.nl  domain  because  the
web  browser  reported  www.renault.nl  could  not  be
found. We presume the resolver (caching DNS) returned
an error, after going through these steps:
-Asking  .NL  TLD  server  for  www.renault.nl  returns
{ns2.xs4all.nl, clara.renault.fr, xenia.renault.fr}.
-Asking ns2.xs4all.nl for www.renault.nl returns no valid
answer (not authoritative).
-Asking  .FR  TLD  server  clara.renault.fr  returns
{auth60.ns.uu.net,  ns1.gip.net,  ns2.gip.net,
anna.renault.fr, clara.renault.fr, xenia.renault.fr}.
-Asking auth60.ns.uu.net for  www.renault.nl returns no
valid answer (not authoritative).
• A zone served  by one  or  more misconfigured servers,
may not  resolve  when one  of  its  correctly  configured
servers malfunctions (limited or no redundancy).
• The entries in the .NL zone file for a zone can not be
modified  (e.g.  moving  name  servers,  switching
providers)  while one of these error conditions persists.
The  Dutch  regulatory  body  SIDN  performs  a  sanity
check, based on its technical regulations [5], on a zone
before allowing modifications to the .NL zone file.
Table 1 provides insight in the round-trip time of queries and
the effect of server misconfigurations. A distinction is made
between:
• No errors: Queries returning no error.
• Errors, limited: Queries returning an error.
• Errors,  full:  Queries  returning  an  error  or  no  answer,
substituting 4,000 ms as cut-off time.
• Errors,  corrected:  Queries  returning  an  error  or  no
answer,  substituting  4,000  ms  as  cut-off  time,
maximizing individual response times to 4,000 ms.
TABLE 1. STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF QUERY TIME IN MS
Query set min avg max stddev
No errors 9 29.2 16375 173.2
Errors, limited 9 492.9 17944 2358.1
Errors, full 9 1866.5 17944 2512.7
Errors, corrected 9 218.3 4000 830.3
Table  1 shows the  impact  of  errors  on  query response
times is substantial: considering the needed extra query after
an error, the elapsed combined query-time of a transaction
involving an error  is almost  ten-fold  that  of  a  transaction
without  errors.  Broadly  speaking,  this  matches  previous
conclusions [1].
Our  study  concludes  1,509  of  the  total  of  23,228
responses were invalid. These responses are excluded from
any subsequent test. They affect 802 domain names (8.02%),
398 of them do not resolve at all.
B. Number of Name Servers
The number of name servers, both defined in the .NL zone
file and in name server (NS) records of the zone, is counted
for the remaining 9.602 zones (Table 2).
SIDN  regulations  ([5]  item  4)  define  the  minimum
number of name servers to be 2, [14] section 5 recommends
a minimum of three and a maximum of five name servers in
most cases. Generally, especially for .NL zones, two name
servers  should  suffice  for  personal  and  small-and-medium
business  domain  names.  For  larger  and/or  internationally
operating companies a number of three name servers should
be used. Only in exceptional cases, a higher number (four or
five) is suited.
TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF NAME SERVER COUNT AMONG ZONES
Number of name
servers
Number of zones (A,
n=9.602)
Number of zones (B,
n=9.602)
1 NS 0 (0%) 5 (0.05%)
2 NS 6842 (71.26%) 6934 (72.21%)
3 NS 2464 (25.66%) 2427 (25.28%)
4 NS 264 (2.75%) 222 (2.31%)
5 NS 24 (0.25%) 14 (0.14%)
6 NS 7 (0.07%) 0 (0%)
7 NS 1 (0.01%) 0 (0%)
Table  2 shows the  number  of  zones  having  a  specific
count of name servers by using two methods.
• Method  A  counts  all  distinct  server  names  serving  a
zone, extracted from both the .NL zone and NS records
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• Method B counts all distinct server names serving a zone
extracted from the NS records in the zone.
Both  counts  are  equal  for  a  correct  second level  zone.
However due to various possible configuration errors, e.g.
renaming  name  servers  without  notifying  SIDN,  omitting
name servers  in  NS records  or  removing  a  zone  from a
secondary or tertiary name servers without notifying SIDN,
these numbers can differ. In a later chapter the differences
between the records in the first level and second levels is
examined in more detail.
For  now,  it  suffices  to  establish  that  both  counts  are
tolerably  equal,  follow  the  guidelines  for  the  number  of
domain names.
[14] remarks “More servers also increase the likelihood
that  one  server  will  be  misconfigured,  or  malfunction,
without being detected.”.  However,  a  higher  server  count
also suggests more resources (money for hosting, bandwidth,
education)  and  consequently  more  knowledgeable
administrators. Or doesn't it?
Too Many Name Servers?
For  each  method  of  counting  and  each  count  of  name
servers, the percentage of zones having at least one server
returning an error condition is computed. This preliminary
data shows a 70% error rate for zones with 4 name servers as
a result of apparent ignorance at ISP Tiscali (records show
that  many domain names are  served by four servers,  only
two of which return authoritative answers). After correcting
the data by excluding these zones from this computation and
ignoring the bogus data for 1, 6 and 7 name servers, Fig. 3
emerges.
Clearly,  an increased number of name servers increases
the  number  of  configuration  errors  and  the  chance  of
receiving  an  erroneous  answer  and  thus  decreases
performance  (Table  1)  and  reliability.  We  expected  the
number of configuration errors to decrease when the number
of  servers  increases,  because  we assessed  the  knowledge
level of “professional” hostmasters (responsible for larger or
more important zones) to be higher than that of “amateur”
host  masters  (making  do  with  the  minimum  number  of
servers required). This hypothesis has been proven false.
Possible causes for this interesting correlation can be:
• Errors caused by misconfiguration are less obvious, the
chance  of  hitting  a  malfunctioning  server,  either  in  a
normal  situation  or  in  a  situation  where  one  of  the
functioning servers is down, is smaller.
• Zone and/or server administrators attach less importance
to the correct configuration of a single server, mistaking
fault-tolerant for error-free.
• Zones having many (4 or more) name servers are often
tailored by hand, in contrast to mass production of low
cost web hosting zones which are frequently generated
by  scripts  and  third-party  control  panels.  Human
intervention increases the chance of making mistakes.
This  data  has  been  set  against  both  the  method  A  and
method B count, because we wanted to see the result against
both the registered (A) and probably intended (B) number of
servers,  as  to  not  skew the  results  of  higher  name server
counts,  because  the  percentage  might  be  influenced
significantly if  even a small  percentage  of  the next  lower
category  contains  an  additional  name  server  in  count  A
versus count B. The graph shows this fear is unwarranted.
The  data  reaffirms our  beliefs  that  only in  exceptional
cases  four  or  more name servers should be defined for  a
single zone.
C. NS Record
Name Server (NS) records include information on (other)
authoritative name servers for the zone (see Section 2). This
information  can  be  used  e.g.  for  load-balancing,  fail-over
and  zone  replication  among  servers.  For  example,  the
domain utwente.nl  has three  name servers:  ns1.utwente.nl,
ns2.utwente.nl  and  ns3.utwente.nl.  These  three  servers
should be known by the .NL zone (which is maintained by
SIDN), as well as the utwente.nl zone, which is maintained
by the University of Twente. 
With respect to the NS records returned by the root (such
as .NL) and the leaf (such as .utwente.nl), the following four
situations may be observed:
• The NS records provided by the root and leafs are equal
(8,975 occurrences). 
This is one of the two correct configurations. 
• Different  leafs  provide  different  NS  records  (34
occurrences).
Although  in  exceptional  cases  having  different  DNS
servers  hand  out  different  NS  records  can  be
advantageous (e.g.  load-balancing using different  DNS
servers  for  distinct  geographical  areas),  in  almost  all
cases it is a sign of error (inconsistent zones) or at least
sub-optimal configuration. 
• All leafs omit NS records from root (123 occurrences). 
This  is  a  serious  misconfiguration,  and  an  explicit
violation of SIDN requirement 6a (leaf zone should at
least contain the servers listed in the root zone).
• All leafs provide extra NS records. 
Since  the  SIDN  does  not  accept  more  than  three  NS
records  in  the  root  zone  per  .NL  domain  name,  two
possibilities exist. The leaf has already registered three
NS records (14 occurrences), or the leaf has registered
less (456 occurrences). In the first case, this is a correct
configuration;  in  the  latter  case  reliability  could
significantly be  improved by registering the  additional
NS record.
In conclusion 1.63% of the surveyed (9,602) zones has one
or more seriously  misconfigured NS records and 4.75% of
the zone can obtain additional reliability and performance by
registering an additional record in the NL root zone.
Fig. 3. Percentage of zones containing at least one malfunctioning server
grouped by name server count
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D. SOA Record
The SOA record of a zone is an instrumental record for
replication  and  caching  of  that  zone.  The  SOA  record
contains seven values:
• MNAME:  Name  of  the  primary  master  server  (SIDN
regulation  6b  states  explicitly  that  this  value  should
correspond with the primary NS record).
• RNAME: E-mail address of the person or role account
responsible  for  maintaining  the  zone.  Although
seemingly trivial, several remarks can be made about the
choice:
-Choosing an e-mail address being in the same zone can
lead  to  unwanted  situations  in  case  of  serious  zone
errors.
-Choosing  an  already  in-use  personal  account  can  be
problematic due to e.g. holidays and employee turnover.
[11]  recommends the definition of a dedicated account
named hostmaster for this reason.
-Choosing an address indicating the mailbox is read now
and in the future is crucial to inviting human feedback on
your zone. Although the survey of actually sending mail
to the RNAME is out of the scope of this research, e-
mail  addresses like  zulucpanel@[zone]  or  [account]
@hotmail.com predict trouble.
• Serial number: The number serves as a unique identifier1
of  a  certain  version  of  a  zone  and  should  always  be
incremented  after  a  change.  This  value  is  a  32  bit
unsigned,  wrappable  integer.  Although  any  numeric
value can be used, several considerations must be made
when choosing a numbering sequence:
-The sequence should allow for enough updates for the
lifetime of the zone.
-The sequence should allow for human interpretation for
debug purposes.
-The  sequence  should  not  be  overflowing  (for  more
information, consult [12]).
-The  sequence  should  not  cause  any  problems  when
moving providers.
[11]  recommends  using  the  numbering  sequence
YYYYMMDDnn  to  satisfy  the  above  mentioned
constraints.
• Refresh, retry, expiry: These values control master-slave
replication.  The  value  refresh  specifies  the  interval  at
which  a  slave  server  should  poll  a  master  to  check
whether  the  serial  number  has  changed.  If  the  master
server is unreachable, the slave tries again after the retry
interval. If after the expiration interval the slave still has
not  contacted  the  master,  it  discards  the  entire  zone.
Obviously,  the  following  inequalities  should  always
hold:
retry < expiry
Logically, the following inequality should also hold:
retry < refresh << expiry
More formally, the following recommendations [8] exist:
expiry < 6 months
expiry > 7 days
expiry > refresh+retry
expiry > 2*retry
refresh > 2*retry
Aside from this polling mechanism, several proprietary
push  mechanisms  exist  (DNS  NOTIFY,  back  end
replication). This does not relieve the zone administrator
1 Virtually all name server software for use in authoritative, public name
servers use this record for synchronization purposes. Different
implementations, e.g. as used in the Microsoft Active Directory system,
are not covered in this survey.
of specifying sensible values!
• Minimum TTL:  This Time-To-Live value specifies the
time  a  caching  server  can  hand  out  a  record  without
requerying a content server (this value can be overridden
on a per RR basis). [11] and [8] recommend a value of
one to five days; however we consider this interval too
high and recommend a maximum value of one day: to
change a DNS record with a TTL of 3 days, the record's
TTL needs to be changed at least three days in advance,
or inconsistent DNS data will exist in hosts for at least
three days. 
The  9,602  active  zones  contained  76  zones  whose  SOA
records  differed  between  servers.  Zones  exhibiting  this
severe  error  have  been  excluded  from  a  further  SOA
examination.
This examination established the following facts:
• The  MNAME  record  of  81  zones  (0.85%)  does  not
correspond with any of the NS records (violation of 6b).
No check has been performed on the remaining 99% to
see whether it pointed to the primary name server and not
an arbitrary NS record,  because the name system does
not provide  a  reliable  way of  establishing the primary
name server,  outside  of:  SIDN's internal  database  (not
available), SIDN whois records (limited to 10 retrievals
per day) and the SOA MNAME record.
TABLE 3A. TOP TEN OF ACCOUNTS IN MNAME; 
3B. DISTRIBUTION OF HOSTS IN MNAME; 
3C. DISTRIBUTION OF TTL AMONG ZONES
A Account Count B Host Count
hostmaster 5255 (55.2%) name server 6679 (70.1%)
postmaster 2284 (24.0%) zone 1395 (14.6%)
root 419 (4.4%) other 1452 (15.2%)
beheer 388 (4.1%)
admin 214 (2.2%) C TTL Count
info 168 (1.8%) 0-12 hours 2322 (24.4%)
netmaster 96 (1.0%) 12-24 hours 6872 (72.1%)
registry 75 (0.8%) 24-36 hours 17 (0.2%)
web 71 (0.7%) 36-48 hours 278 (2.9%)
dnsadmin 41 (0.4%) 48- hours 37 (0.4%)
• RNAME: Table  3A lists the top ten of account names
chosen in the MNAME record, combined with the host
reference in Table 3B. 70.1% of all contact addresses are
located in the same domain hierarchy as one of the zone's
NS  records  (for  example  RNAME
hostmaster@provider.nl and NS records ns1.provider.nl).
14.6% of the addresses  are situated  at  the  zone  itself.
Only  15.2%  of  the  addresses  are  located  elsewhere
(though possibly still  handled  by the  same name- and
mail servers): though, based on considerations discussed
before, this is part of the target scenario. The other part
of the target is a dedicated role account: Table 3A shows
that  the  majority  of  the  zones  have  such  an  account
name,  although  root  and  info  infringe  clearly  on  this
recommendation.
• Serial number: As displayed in Fig. 4 more than 80% of
all  zones  follow  the  preferred  numbering  sequence
(simpledate2).  About  6%  uses  the  unixtime  (seconds
since the epoch, January 1st 1970) sequence. This method
also  allows  for  debugging  and  enough  updates.
Simpledate1 (YYYYMMDDn) is not a recommendation,
but still allows for 10 individual zone changes per day so
both  this  method  (1.3%)  and  unixtime  are  valid
numbering sequences. The usage (1.7%) of simpledate0
(YYYYMMDD)  is  not  recommended,  because  it
severely limits the number of changes in a zone to one
per day. 
The figure also shows 5.6% uses a counter sequence (1,
2,  3)  and  6.2%  uses  an  unknown  serial  numbering
method. We strongly discourage usage of both methods
because, besides possible correctness issues, they do not
allow  for  easy  human  debugging  (“Has  the  zone
administrator processed my change request?”).
• Refresh, retry, expiry: For 35 zones (0.37%) the general
inequality  does  not  hold.  This  can  (and  should  for
software  following  standards2)  cause  problems  with
replication:  whenever  a  server  is  unreachable  during
refresh.
A rather large number of domains, 330 zones (3.46%),
does not pass the logical inequality. Most of these have a
retry larger than their refresh, meaning that in the event
of a failure during replication, a retry will be scheduled
later than a normal refresh would. Normally, the retry is
a fraction of the refresh, not the other way around
846  zones  (8.88%)  fail  the  complete  set  of
recommendations, most specifying a lower expiry than 7
days. 103 zones specify a definitely too low value of 3
hours or less. In the event of master name server failure,
the slaves can start answering not-authoritative after only
three hours. Thus a malfunction in the master server at
night can have very unpleasant side-effects. 
• TTL: Table 3C shows 96.5% of the surveyed zones have
a TTL value of  one day or  less,  corresponding to  our
recommendation  and  somewhat  departing  from  the
formal  recommendations.  Most  probably  many
administrators (and/or clients) are not prepared to plan
zone updates several days in advance. A worthy mention
is the single occurrence minimum TTL of 60 weeks.
E. MX Record
An MX record in a zone defines a mail exchanger for the
domain: a server capable of receiving mail for the domain. A
zone can have multiple mail servers, and thus multiple MX
records.  Using the  priority field  in  a  MX record,  a  zone
2 In this section conclusions are based on [10], [11]; vendor or version
specific implementations are not taken into account.
administrator can define relationships between MX servers
(e.g. primary server, shared secondary, tertiary).
When a domain has MX records defined,  a mail server
should connect to  the A record (if  present),  for  backward
compatibility reasons. Domains having no MX records and
no A record for the zone are unable to receive email and are
in violation of SIDN regulation 2b, as well as best practices
[11]. When a domain has only one MX/A record, mail will
be queued on the remote site when the mail server is down.
For  this  reason,  load-balancing,  redundancy  and
performance many sites define more than one MX record,
possibly pointing at an ISP provided server destined to be
used only in case of emergencies.
Even though it  is  possible  to  specify priorities  of  mail
servers, limiting the amount of mail reaching some servers,
adding MX records adds these servers to the pools and adds
to the complexity and reliability of the system (example: if
any of the mail servers reject a mail with error code 550 or
553 due to  the domain name or  user name not known to
them, other MXs may not be tried). Therefore, we make the
same  recommendation  as  we  did  when  reviewing  NS
records: use two, or maybe three, but not more, strategically
chosen  mail  servers  (e.g.  primary  site,  backup  site,  ISP)
because for most organizations we assume this will be the
point where reliability can only go down instead of up by
adding more MX records. Unlike the optimal number of NS
records, the relation between reliability and number of MX
records can not be proven simply in this work. So instead,
we present two considerations to establish plausibility for the
theory  that  a  maximum  number  of  three  MX  records
(equalling to three unique mail configurations, either servers
or clusters) is preferable:
• Mail servers are in many management aspects similar to
name servers: zones/servers for “larger” domains tend to
be  administrated  by hand and  failure  to  deliver  an  e-
mail/an answer is not evident. This is also expressed in
[14]: more servers also increase the likelihood that one
server  will  be  misconfigured,  or  malfunction,  without
being detected.
• Ignoring performance and focusing solely on reliability:
assume  that  a  server  has  a  0.001%  chance  to  be
misconfigured and rejecting e-mail, a server has a chance
of  2%  to  be  unreachable  and  a  zone  has  three  mail
configurations (MX records), the chance of having not a
single  misconfigured  server  in  a  zone  is  99.9970%
whereas the chance at least one server being reachable is
99.9992%.  When  having  two  configurations,  these
values  are  99.9980%  and  99.9600%  respectively.  All
servers being unreachable is a more favourable scenario
than  one  server  being  misconfigured:  all  servers
unreachable only delays, not discards mail.
Table  4 shows 206 zones having no mail servers at all and
141 having no MX records, but one or more A records. The
most common configuration is one mail exchanger, closely
followed by two. Almost ten percent of the surveyed zones
has four or more mail servers: a risk to reliability.
TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF MAIL SERVER COUNT AMONG ZONES
Number of mail servers Number of zones
0 MX, 0 A 206
0 MX, 1+ A 141
1 MX 3980
2 MX 3386
Fig. 4. Distribution of serial number sequences
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Number of mail servers Number of zones
3 MX 937
4 MX 641
5 MX 300
6 MX 8
7 MX 3
F. Properties of Servers
Besides  the  data  in  the  zone,  server  properties  also
influence DNS reliability and performance. Some properties
affecting  these  factors  are  physical  link  type  (e.g.
redundancy, speed), and geographical location (extensively
covered  in  [1]).  This  section  focuses  on  two  one-
dimensional  server  properties.  These properties  have been
retrieved  along  with  other  data  in  this  survey  simply  by
querying the name server.
• Name server software
Most of the commonly used name server software allows
the  retrieval  of  the  software  name  and  version  by
querying the version.bind zone in class chaos for a TXT
RR.
Obviously a set of heterogeneous, supported name server
software versions serves reliability and performance best.
• Recursion policy
If a name server allows recursive queries then it can be
used as a caching server by any client. Recursive queries
(Fig.  1)  drain  server  resources  and  can  lead  to  cache
pollution  [13]  and  should  be  answered  by  a  separate
server.
A name server  has been queried  by testing whether  it
returns  an address  when asked for  www.example.com.
This  assumes  no  authorised  user  (e.g.  local  user)  has
recursively looked up this domain for the past two days
(due to minimum TTL).
All  servers  generating  at  least  one  authoritative  answer
(2,850) have been tested on these properties. Fig. 5 details
the distribution of software among name servers. A majority
(58,8%) of these run a current version of ISC BIND (8 & 9),
7.6%  of  sampled  servers  run  the  Dutch  newcomer
PowerDNS  and  almost  20%  runs  an  unidentified  name
server  (not  responding  to  the  version.bind  attribute,
presumably DJBDNS and  Microsoft  DNS).  An additional
14% of name servers answer in an ambiguous way: BIND
allows for redefinition of the version.bind RR to any value.
The examined values "Go screw someone else!" or "request
logged and reported to abuse!" can only lead to provocation.
Entering contact information for the DNS administrator or
the  class  of  software  (BIND  8)  seems  like  a  better
redefinition, if any. 
After mapping the responses of the name servers to a class
of  software  (BIND 4,  PowerDNS 2  etc.),  the  number  of
different classes of name server software per zone has been
established. 91.82% of zones is served by only one class of
software,  8.11% is  served  by two different  classes  and  6
domains are served by three different classes of which only
the  domain  umbs.nl  (Universiteit  Maastricht  Business
School)  is  verifiably  served  by  three  different  software
classes (BIND 4, 8 and 9).
Recursion  is  enabled  on  1934  (67.86%)  servers  and
disabled  on  the  rest.  Even  if  recursive  queries  are  to  be
allowed by the servers, e.g. because they serve local or dial-
up users, then access restrictions should be imposed and all
other hosts should not be permitted to ask recursive queries.
To  allow for maximum reliability and performance,  the
following recommendations can be made:
• Either do not redefine the version.bind RR, or redefine
the record to something sensible.
• Employ multiple classes of DNS software to prevent a
bug in one name server software from disabling all name
servers (on purpose or not) for a specific zone.
• Disable or restrict access to recursion.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have investigated 10,000 DNS zones for
correctness. The following calculation shows the breakdown
of encountered error conditions, not counting any zone more
than once:
Starting set 10,000 zones
One or more lame delegations -802 zones
Four or more NS records -54 zones
Different leafs different NS records -5 zones
Leafs omit NS records -73 zones
Registerable NS record -242 zones
Different leafs different SOA records -56 zones
MNAME not in NS records -9 zones
R, R, E logical equation error -155 zones
Four or more MX records -919 zones
======
No issues 7,685 zones
It turns out that, of the 10,000 zones, only 7,685 do not
have any issues. If we neglect the less problematic “Four or
more  MX  records”  error,  14%  of  all  tested  .NL domain
names  does  not  fulfil  all  configuration  requirements,
recommendations  or  best  practices.  As  a  result,  the
reliability  and  performance  of  DNS is  not  as  good  as  it
should be. Since the .NL domain is regarded as one of the
best managed zones worldwide ([1] Fig. 2a), we expect these
errors to show up in most other top level domain zones as
well.
One of the most interesting conclusions of this research is
that a higher number of name servers does not automatically
lead to an increase in reliability. In fact the opposite is true;
if  the  number of  name servers increases beyond a certain
point reliability and performance usually decrease (section
5.2).
Fig. 5. Distribution of software among name servers
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Further  research may be needed to find even more and
different error conditions in more Resource Records (RRs).
Our  findings should  also  be  cross-referenced and  verified
with other top level domains.
Compared to previous research by Pappas et al. [1] [2],
our  research is  both broader  in the number and nature of
checks,  but  also  more  narrow since  we have  limited  our
research to a single domain. Because of these characteristics,
we have found more error conditions and also more zones
with errors. This survey agrees to the sad state of DNS as
presented  in  commercial  research  by  Credentia  [16]  and
Men & Mice [17]. 
The results of this research should be used to increase the
reliability and performance of the name system, raising it to
the levels envisioned at the design time of this redundant,
distributed system. Such higher quality of DNS service can
be achieved by:
• Education:  DNS  administrators  can  gain  insight  in
common errors and misconfigurations.
• Prevention:  The  .NL  regulatory  body  can  adopt  and
enforce  new  technical  regulations  for  domain
registrations. These regulations could be enforces by an
autonomous  program  surveying  the  .NL  zones,
contacting  the  responsible  account  about  errors  and
disabling the leaf if necessary.
• Research: The results of this research are, possibly after
further investigation, equally applicable to other TLDs.
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